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ADMINISTRATION.
1. The County Courts of this State (Texas) may grant letters of limited
administration upon the estates of deceased persons. This power existed
under the Act of 1704, ch. 1, 47, and is clearly created and defined as to
the estates of non-resident decedents, by the Acts of 1842, chs. 60 and 165.
But such special administration does not prevent a grant of the general
administration in a proper case to a different person; and the two administrations may well subsist together. Jordan vs. Polk,
- 555
2. A limited administration, as contemplated by the laws of this State,
is not within the letter or spirit of the law prescribing to whom the general
administration shallbe grante(l. The next of kin or creditors cannot claim
a right to special administration, if occupying an antagonistic relation to
those who represent the deceased So, where the deceased, a non-resident,
had no estate in the limits of this State, except the subject of a suit which
he was prosecuting at the time of his death against his brother, it was no
error in the County Court to refuse the general or special administration
to such brother, and confer the special administration upon an indifferent
person. Ibid.
ADMIRALTY.
See Collision-Lien.
PasengerAct, Ship, 1--4.
Coal barges, being large rough trunks or boxes, made merely for transportif.g coals, and usually sold for lumber at the end of the voyage, and
not having any coasting license, are not the subject of admiralty jurisdiction. Jones vs. Cincinnati Coal Company, 391
AGENCY.
1. Where stock sold by an avowed owner, dealing as owner, turns out
afterwards to be spurious and void, by reason of its having been illegally
issued, the purchaser may recover back the price paid, though the seller
was ignorant of his want of title. Ketchum vs. Bank of Commerce of New
York.
-.
14-5
2. A pledgee of stock on collateral security, with power to sell at public
or private sale without notice, and to assign coupled with a blank power
for that purpose, who has actually transferred the stock into his own name,
.,tands as to thirdl persms in the light of owner, though himself still subject,
it Rveuns, to the pldgor's right to redeem; and is therefore liable to an
action by a purchaser from him for the price paid, in case the stock turns
out spurious. Ibid.
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3 The principles which govern a common law partner.bip, are in general
applicable to a Joint Stock Company, whether incorporated or not, except
so far as modified by statute, or special rules of law. The introduction of
new members into such association can, hence, be only authorized by joint
consent ; but this consent may be exercised either on each special occasion,
or may be dele-ated to a particular, without power to redelegate it to an
individual. The issue of certificates of stock in such association, being the
introduction thereinto, of new partners, falls within this principle. Ibid.
4. Held on the construction of the charter of the New York and New
Haven Hail Road Company, that a resolution of the Board of Directors of
that company, by which Robert Schuyler was appointed "transfer agent"
of its certificates of stock, was a valid delegation of power, and that certificates of stock issued by Schuyler as such agent were binding on the
Company. Ibid.
5. The limitation of the amount of capital stock of the Company, in its
charter. held not to prohibit the Board of Directors, nor their agent thus
appointed, as regards third persons, from increasing the number of !hares
of stock, beyond the proportion between their par value and the capital
stock. Ibid.
6 The registration of certificates of stock in the books of the Company,
though made a pre-requisite to the right of voting or of exercising any
control in the management of the Company, is not necesary to a valid
title in the stock itself: and so the absence of a power to transfer will not
affect the rights of a bona fide purchaser of a certificate of stock; he would
thereby only become the equitable instead of the legal holder, but with the
right to procure a transfer on the books of the Company. Ibid.
7. Where a transfer agent appointed by the Directors of an Incorporated
Joint Stock Company, has fraudulently over issued stock, a director taking
such stock directly from the agent is chargeable with constructive notice,
especially where the fraud would have been discoverable by an inspection
of the books of the Company. But this does not apply, where he purchases
from a bonafide holder; and query, whether such constructive notice would
affect a firm of which the director was a member. Ibid.
ANSWER.
See Equity. 2.
APPEAL.
See Equity. 2.
ATTACIIMENT.
1. Our foreign attachment is a procedure in rein, and a sale of chattels
unler it passes the title clear of all liens, and the claims of the lien holders
attaches to the proceeds, which will be distributed according to the rights
Carryl vs. Taylor,
314
M
2. Where chattels are sold as perishable, unler a foreign attaliment,
the whole title is transferred, and all claimants and lien holders must come
in and claim against the proceeds before distribution. Ibid.
3. Practice where property attached is claimed by a third person. Ibid.
BILL OF EXCHANGE.
1. The vendor of a bill of exchange, though not a party to the bill, is
responsible for the genuineness of the instrument and if the name of one
of the parties is a forgery, and the bill becomes valueless, the vendee is
entitled to recover the price. Gurney vs. Womersley,
;02
2. The defendants, who were bill brokers, having received from A. a bill
of exchange drawn and endorsed by him, for the purpose of being discounted took it to the plaintiffs, who were money lenders, with - h,0,n the
dfudants had prcvi)uly hal dealings: they detlined to endor-e, r guarantce it, and the plaintiffs, upon the credit of the acceptance, di-comnted it.
of all.

IN DE X.
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There were separate notes between A. and the defendants, and the defenlants and the plaintiffs; and the rate of discount charged by the defendants
to .\. was higher than that charged by the ilaintiti'; to the dtfllnlits.
The acceptance was forged by A., and the bill was valueless. .11 d. that
the defendants having been found by the jury to have dealt with the bill as

principals, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the sum paid to the defendants upon the discount of the bill.

I bid.

BOND.
The bona fide holder of railroad bonds, having no notice of any defect in
the title of the seller, has a perfect title to them, clear of all equities between
the company and seller. The Morris Canal and Banking Co., Appellants,
and Fisher, Appellee,
424
BOTTOMRY.
See Lien.
CALIFORNIA.

1-4.

See Land Law.

1-4.

CARRIER.
See Steamboat. 1, 2.
1. A common carrier, or other bailee for the transportation of property,
must permit the consignee, if lie requests it, to examine the cargo at the
place of delivery, before lie can demand his freight. Ishames. Greenlham. 49S
2. The duties of the carrier, and consignee, are correlative: the one to
deliver, and the other to pay the freight; both are mutual acts. Ibid.
3. Where the carrier demands a larger sum than that-which is stipulated
by contract, and refuses to deliver the property at the place of its de.stination until such additional sum is paid, he may be sued in tort for the conversion. Ibid.
4. Where the carrier refuses to receive any sum less than the whole
amount he thus claims, and the consignee offers to pay the sum stipulated
in the contract, no formal tender of that sum is required from the consignee: the law in such a case will not ask him to do a vain thing. Ibid.
5. A railway company, as common carriers of passengers and their luggage, are bound, on the arrival of a train at the terminus of the journey,
to deliver a passenger's luggage into a carriage to be conveyed from their
station, if required so to do, and if such is their usual practice. Affirming Richards vs. The London and South Coast Railway Company. Butcher r. . The London and South-Western Railway Company.
694
6. Therefore, where a passenger on the arrival of the train got out of
the railway carriage on to the platform with a part of his luggage, a small
hand-bag, in his hand, which he gave to one of the company's porters to
take to a cab, and the porter lost it, the company were held liable as for a
non-delivery of the bag; it not being found by the jury that the passenger,
by taking the bag into his own possession on the platfbr,
had accepted
that as a performance of the company's contract to deliver, according to
their usual practice, into a cab. Ibid.
7. A declaration, setting out nothing but a general or ordinary engagement by the defendants as common carriers, is not supported by proof of a
contract, containing a special exception of the liability of the defendants
for any loss which may arise from "the damage of the river, fire, and unavoidable accident."
In such case, the plaintiff must be nonsuited on
the ground of variance between pleadings and proofs. Davidson m's.
Grahan.
291
8. Such special exception to the defendant's liability may be lawfully
created by special contract between the parties, though it cannot be made
by general notice, known or unknown to the party engaging the services
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of the common carrier.

The case of Jones vs. Voorhees, 10 0. R. 145, ex-

plained. Ibid.
9. Although the common carrier may by special contract restrict his
liability, so far as he is an insurer against losses by mistake or accident,
he cannot thus exempt himself from losses caused by any neglect of that
degree of diligence pertaining to his peculiar character as bailee. Ibid.
10. The burden of proof, that the loss occurred from one of the excepted
causes, rests on the defendant. Ibid.
CATTLE.
See Railroads.
CHARITABLE USES.
1. A testator devised as follows: "Forasmuch as there will be a surplus income of my estate beyond what will be necessary to pay my said
wife's annuity and the other annuities, I do therefore direct my said executors to invest the said surplus income and all accumulation of interest
arI-ing from that source yearly, for and during all the term of the natural
life of my said wife, * * * I and from and immediately after the decease
of my said wife, then all the rest, residue and remainder of all my estate,
I I * * * I authorize and empower my executors, or the survivor of them,
after the decease of my said wife, to dispose of the same for the use of such
charitable institutions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina as they or he
may deem most beneficial to mankind, and so that part of the colored population in each of the said States of Pennsylvania and South Carolina shall
partake of the benefit thereof." All the executors of the will died before
the testator's widow, and without having attempted to make an appointment under the power conferred on them. ITeld, that the disposition of the
residuary estate of the testator, subject to the power of appointment of the
executors, failed, and that the heirs and next of kin of the testator were
entitled to it. Fontain vs. Ravenel.
264, 330
2. No Court of Chancery, either in South Carolina or Pennsylvania, can
administer the fund in question, and it remains unaffected by the bequest,
because the means through which it was to have been given and applied
have failed. Ibid.
3. In England, when the Chanceller directs the application of property
which has been the subject of an ineffectual charitable disposition, in accordance with the will of the sovereign, indicated under the sign-manual,
or when that officer himself executes the cypres power in regard to such
property, he does not act in the discharge of his ordinary chancery powers.
Ibid.
4. .o special trust is vested in the executors, by reason of this power of
appointment. It is separable and distinct from their ordinary duties
and trust as executors.
It was to be exercised after the death of the
wife of the testator; but the executors died before her decease, and consequently they had no power to make the appointment. The conditions
annexed by the testator to the power rendered the appointment impossible. Ibid.
5. There must be some creative energy to give embodiment to an intention which was never perfected. Nothing short of the prerogative power,
it would seem, can reach this case. There is not only uncertainty in the
benficiaries of this charity, but there is a more formidable objection-there
is no expressed will of the testator. He intended to speak through his executors, or the survivor of them, but by the acts of Providence this has become impossible. It is then as though he had not spoken, and no power
can now speak for him except that of theparenspatrim. Ibid.
6. When there is nothing more than a power of appointment conferred
by the testator, there is nothing on which a trust, on general principles,
can be fastened. The power given is a mere agency of the will, which
may or may not be exercised at the discretion of the individual. And if
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there be no act on his part, the property never having passed out of the
testator, it necessarily remains as a part of his estate. To meet such cases,
a prerogative power, such as that of the king, in England, must be invoked, which there, through the Chancellor, can give effect to the charity.
Tbid.

7. Some late decisions in England, involving charities, evince a disposition rather to restrict than enlarge the powers exercised on this subject.
An arbitrary rule in regard to property, whether by a king, or chancellor,
or both, leads to uncertainty and injustice. Ibid.
COLLISION.
See Ship. 1-3.
1. Duties of steamers in the navigation of the Mississippi. Shute vs.
Goslee; Goslee vs. Shute. .
.
.
.
465
2. A steamer leaving the ordinary and usual track of vessels under the
circumstances, is bound to show some palpable necessity for the deviation. Ibid.
3. An ascending boat, running at great speed in a dark night, at a time
when a descending boat is visible, of whose course she is doubtful, takes
the risk of a collision: she ought to ease or stop her engines, till she is
assured of the course of the other. Ibid.
4. A steamer is responsible for a collision which a better lookout than
she had might have prevented. Ibid.
5. Where a collision is produced by the fault of one boat, she cannot
cQmplain that the other had not used extraordinary measures of precaution before, or the clearest judgment in the selection of the method of extrication, after the collision became imminent. Ibid.
6. A libellant, claiming damages on the ground of a collision with
another boat, must make it appear that there was no want of ordinary
care and skill, in the management of his boat, and that the injury for
which he claims compensation, resulted from the sole fault of the other
boat. But the faulty management of one boat, will not excuse the want
of proper care and skill in the other. Lucas et al. vs. The Steamboat
Swann.
.
.
.
.
.
659
7. A case of damage resulting from inevitable accident, is defined to
be, "that which a party charged with an offence, could not possibly prevent by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill." Ibid.
8. There is no ground for the conclusion in this case, that the injury
was unavoidable; but on the contrary, it is a case of mixed or mutual
fault. Ibid.
9. But to constitute a proper basis for a decree, apportioning the damages
equally to each boat, as in a case of mixed or mutual fault, the evidence
must enable the Court to find the specific faults of each, from which the
injury resulted. Ibid.
10. If the Court is satisfied, that both boats were in fault, and yet from
the conflict in the evidence, cannot find, with reasonable certainty, the specific faults of each, it constitutes a case of inscrutable fault; and, in such
case, in accordance with the law as settled in the United States, a decree
for the equal apportionment of the damages as resulting from the injury,
may be entered. Ibid.
11. The present is adjudged to be such a case, and a decree is entered in
accordance with the principle stated. Ibid.
COMMITMENT.
See Habeas Corpus. 3.
COMMON CARRIER.
See Carrier. Railroads. Steamboat.
COMMON SCOLD.
See Criminal Law.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
See Judgment. 1-6.
1. In 1760, the Legislature of New Jersey authorized certain owners of
meadow lands along Little Timber Creek to dam the said creek. Such
act is constitutional, and vests an interest; it is more than a mere license,
and cannot be revoked by the State.

Glover vs. PowelL

-

-

-

367

2. The Legislature must be the sole judge and arbiter in determining
what streams shall be navigable, and when they may be obstructed and
their navigation destroyed for public necessity or convenience. Ibid.
3. An individual cannot question the legislation of the State as to the
rights of navigation, unless he can call to his aid the paramount authority
of the general government. Ibid.
4. What constitutes a navigable stream. Ibid.
5. In 1854, the Legislature passed an act for the removal of the dam
erected and continued under the act of 1760; the ac; of 185-4 violates the
Constitution of the State, and an injunction will be granted by this Court
to restrain any action under it. Ibid.
6. A forfeiture cannot be declared by the Legislature, it can only be
done by the Courts in due process of law. Ibid.
7. A Court of the United States has the power to prevent by injunction,
the present or future erection of any bridge under the authority of one of
the States, that by its construction will interfere with the navigation of a
public stream upon which there is a commerce to any considerable extent
with other States, though such stream lies wholly within the limits of the
State. The question in such case is relative, whether the bridge be or be
not a greater obstruction to commerce than benefit to the-public. Devoe
79
8. In such case, unless irreparable damage would be done to the defendants thereby, and though an answer be put in denying both the fact
and the law, an interlocutory injunction may be granted upon affidavits,
at once, until further order; and an issue may be then directed to determine whether the bridge under its present form, &c., is a nuisance to the
navigation of the river, and if so, whether any bridge can be constructed
at the particular spot which will not be a nuisance. Ibid.
9. An action by the Fedeial Government is subject to the forms of pleading and the rules of practice applicable to suits between individuals. The
United States vs. The Railroad Bridge Company, et al.,
- 603
10. The commercial power of the Federal Government under the constitution, discussed. Ibid.
11. Land purchased for military purposes cannot be sold without special
authority from Congress; otherwise as to land reserved out of the public
domain and then abandoned. lbid
12. Construction of the Act of Congress of Aug. 4, 1852, grantingthe right
of way through public lands. Ibid.
13. The power of a State to grant the right of eminent domain to a private
corporation. Ibid.
14. The right of eminent domain is in the State, and the exercise of this
right by a 3tate is nowhere inhibited in the Federal Constitution, or in the
powers exercised over the public lands. Ibid.
15. A State has power to authorize a railroad through the public lands of
the United States. Ibid.
16. Irreparable injury to the public lands will alone justify an injnnction. Ibid.
17. It is provided by the Constitution of Wisconsin, Art 8, 1, that "the
rate of taxation shall be uniform, and taxes shall be levied upon such property as the Legislature shall direct." In 1854, the Legislature of that
State passed an act requiring ",all Railroad Companies which were or
should be organized within the State," to pay to the State Treasurer
annually, for the use of the State, "a sum equal to one per cent. of the
gross earnings of their respective roads." The Act further declared, that
"this amount of tax shall take the place and be in full of all of the taxes

vs. Penrose Ferry Bridge Co.
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of every name and kind upon said road, and the property belonging to
the said companies or the stock held by individuals therein; and it shall
not be lawful to assess thereupon any other or further assessment or tax
for any purpose whatever."
Held, that this act was not unconstitutional, though the annual assessment on Railroad Companies, was to be on income, instead of on property,
as in other cases; and though the companies were exempted thereby from
town, county, and district taxes. The Milwaukie and Mississippi Railroad
Co. vs. The Supervisors of Waukesha County,

679

-

18. Under the grant of power to Congress, to regulate commerce among
the several States, as given by the Constitution of the United States, the
general government has jurisdiction over navigable streams, so far as may
be necessaryfor commercial purposes. Jolly et aL vs. Terre Haute DrawBridge Co., ...

.

19. A steamboat, enrolled and licensed pursuant to the Act of Congress,
is entitled to the protection of the general government, while engaged in
carrying on commerce between different States; and her owners have a
right to use the navigable streams of the country, free from all material
obstructions to navigation. Ibid.
20. In relation to the States carved out of the N. W. Territory, the guaranty in the ordinance of '87, as to navigable streams, is still
in force.
Ibid.
21. The Courts of the Union, having jurisdiction of the parties in a civil
suit, are competent to administer the common law remedy for an injury
sustained by reason of an unlawful obstruction in a navigable stream,
without any express legislation by Congress, giving the remedy, and prescribing the mode of its enforcement. Ibid.
22. The national jurisdiction over navigable streams does not deprive the,
States of the exercise of such rights over them, as they may deem expedient,
subordinate to the power granted by the Constitution of the United States.
Ibid.
23. A bridge of sufficient elevation, or with a proper draw, is not necessarily an impediment to navigation; neither is any structure or fixture such
impediment, which facilitates commerce instead of being a hindrance.
Ibid.
24. The inquiry in this case is, whether the bridge with the draw erected
by the defendant at Terre Haute, is a material obstruction to the navigation
of the Wabash river.

Ibid.

25. If it occasions merely slight stoppages and loss of time, unattended
with danger of accident to life or property, it is not such obstruction.
Ibid.
26. The Terre Haute bridge was built under a charter from the State of
Indiana, which required a "convenient draw" in the bridge. This imports
a draw which can be passed without vexatious delay, or risk; and, if not
such a one, the charter is violated; but if it meets the requirement of the
act of incorporation, and is yet a material obstruction, it is a nullity for the
want of power in the legislature to pass such an act. Ibid.
27. If the jury find the bridge is a material obstruction, but that the
injury sustained by the plaintiffs' boat was the result of recklessness, or
want of skill in those having charge of her, the Bridge Company are not
liable, and evidence of the good professional reputation of the pilot will
avail nothing, if in this particular case, he was reckless and unskilful.
Ibid
28. Depositions taken under the Act of Congress, without notice to the
opposite party, are admissible in evidence; but it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to which they are entitled. 1bid.
29. The evidence of experts, if uncontradicted and unimpeached, is
entitled to great weight. Ibid.

49

29
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30. If the jury find for the plaintiffs, they may include in the damages
given, the probable earnings of their boat, for the time she was delayed in
repairing the damages sustained. Ibid.
CONSTRUCTION.
See Will.
CONTEMPT.
See Habeas Corpus. 3.
CONTRACT.
1. One to whom a slave ishiredfor a year, is entitled to no abatement of
the price because of the death of the slave after the commencement of the
term.

Lennard vs. Boynton,

-

42-

2. A receipt containing an agreement, stipulation, or condition between
4032
the parties, is in the nature of a contract. Wilson vs. Dailey,
3. Parties who appear on the face of a contract, t6 be the only parties
bound, cannot introduce parol proof to show that they are not the parties
bound, but the third persons are in reality the contracting parties. Ibid.
4. It is admissible, to show that the act of the party signing the contract,
is also the act of his principal, so as to render the latter also liable. Ibid.
5. Where the defendant answers that he executed the contract upon which
he is sued, as a broker or agent, and after the testimony is before the Court,
claims to amend his answer so as to show he executed the contract under
a mistake of his legal responsibility thereon, the Court will not grant leave
to amend unless the facts proved, show at least a reasonable probability
that this can be established. Ibid.
6. A master cannot absolve himself from the legal and equitable obligation to take care of his slave; and if he refuse to do so, he is liable for
medical and other relief furnished by others. Thompson vs. Alexander,
540
-7. If a slave be hired to an insolvent, or be out of the possession of the
hirer, and be placed in a situation to require instant and indispensable
medical aid or other assistance; in such a case the owner, as well as the
hirer, would probably be liable for necessary medical and other services. lb.
8. The hirer of the slave, and not the general owner, is liable in an action
for medicine and medical services rendered the slave while the term of hiring
continued-the services and medicine not being rendered at the request of
the owner, but at the request of the hirer. Ibid.
9. A particular custom in a country, that the general owner shall pay
the expenses, does not supersede or control the legal principle. Ibid.
10. The hirer of a negro is not entitled to an abatement from the price on
account of the sickness of the negro, unless the sickness originated in causes
existing at the time of hiring, and which were unknown to the hirer. Ibid.
11. The hirer of a slave is bound to use ordinary diligence, in regard to
the health of the slave; that is, such diligence as a prudent man commonly
takes of his own slave; and this ordinary diligence is to be employed, not
only in protecting the slave from danger and disease, but likewise in discovering the disease if it exists, and in its treatment also. Ibid.
12. If the hirer of a slave fail to perform his duty in supplying the slave
with medical and other necessary assistance, the owner may do it, and look
to the hirer for reimbursement. Ibid.
13. Under special circumstances, the hirer, although preliminarily liable
to the physician, might, nevertheless, be entitled to relief, as between the
owner and himself, especially in a Court of Equity. Ibid.
14. If a slave hired for general and common service, be employed at any
hazardous business, without the consent of the owner, and death, or any
other damage ensue, the hirer would make himself liable for the injury. Tb.
15. Notwithstanding the hirer be answerable, in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary, for expenses attendant on the sickness of a
slave, it is competent to protect himself by contract. Ibid.
COPYRIGHT.
1. The copying of a statuette by means of the daguerreotype or other

INDEX.
photographic apparatus, and the use of the stereoscope to give relief to the
copies thus made, to the injury of the owner of the original work of art, is
570
an infringement of his copyright. Marchi vs. Samson. 2. By stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 18, when the proprietor of any periodical
same
and
the
work shall employ any person to compose any article thereof,
shall have been composed on the terms that the copyright therein shall
belong to such proprietor, the copyright shall be the property of such
proprietor: Held, that these terms need not be expressed, but may be
implied.

684

Sweet vs. Benning.

3. Where an author is employed by the proprietor of a periodical work
to write for it articles on certain terms as to the price, but without any
mention of the copyright, it is to be inferred that the copyright was to belong to such proprietor. Ibid.
4. The defendants, who were proprietors of a periodical professing to be
an analytical digest of equity, common law, and other cases, copied verbatim the head or marginal notes of cases from reports, the copyright of
which was in the plaintiffs, without their consent: Held to be a piracy,
(Maule, J., dissentiente.) Ibi&

CORPORATION.
See Agency. 8.
CRIMINAL LAW.
1. No indictment can now be sustained in Pennsylvania against a female,
113
as a common scold. Commonwealth vs. Hutchinson.
2. Whether an indictment concluding "against the peace of thefaithful
subjects of this Commonwealth" is good, dubitatur. Ibid.
COVENANTS FOR TITLE.
See Vendor and Vendee.
DAMAGES.
See Negligence.
DEED.
An exception in a grant of lands in these words, "excepting and reserving out of the said piece of land so much as is necessary for the use of a
grist-mill on the east side of the road, at the west end of the said mill-dam,"
is a good exception; but until the grantor or his assigns exercise the right
reserved, and builds the mill, it is not operative, and ejectment cannot be
117
sustained. Mathews vs. Mathews.
DEVISE.
See Will.
DOMICILE.
See Russellvs. Harvey.

-

.

.

..

.

560

EDITOR.
1. The editor of a collective work, has the right, even in the absence of
any special agreement, to make such changes and suppressions in the articles of contributors, as he may judge proper, so long as those changes and
suppressions do not affect the plan and idea of the original. Malgaigne
vs. De Saint Priest.

-

-

2. The task of correcting for the press, the proofs of articles in such a
work, belongs to the editor. Ibid.
EJECTMENT.
See Deed.
EQUITY.
See Charitable Uses, Injunction.
1. Under the rules of the Courts of Equity in Pennsylvania, a defendant
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may by answer protect himself against discovery, through a denial of the
complainant's title, to the same extent as he could by plea in England:
and he is not deprived of this right by submitting unnecessarily to answer
some of the interrogatories of the bill, against which he might also have
183

Perry vs. Kinley.

protected himself.

2. Under the Act of 1845, of Pennsylvania, with regard to appeals in equity, an appeal perfected, after the levy of a fi.fa., or a decree, but before sale,
116

Chillas vs. Brett. -

is a supersedeas.

EVIDENCE.
1. Articles of co-partnership having been formally executed, it is not competent for one partner to prove by parol that a consideration was to be paid
by the other for making the contract, other than appears in the instrument;
there being no allegation of mistake or fraud in preventing the insertion of
the stipulation.

Brett vs. Chillas.

-

-

-

-

407

2. On a trial for murderthe prisoner's counselwere about calling witnesses
to prove his insanity, when he interposed, refused to permit that defence to
be set up. discharged his counsel and submitted his case to the jury without evidence. The counsel remonstrated, and offered to establish his insanity by irresitible proof, but the Court overruled their objection, and refused to hear them further in his defence. Held to be error, and that the
evidence should have been permitted to go to the jury. State vs. James
532

Patton, appellant.

EXECUTORS.
See Set-off.
FORCE BILL.
See Habeas Corpus.

1-2.

FOREIGN ATTACHMENT.
See Attachment.
The goods of a non-resident debtor, in the hands of a person residing in
this State, are liable to be held by a writ of foreign attachment, although
301
the goods themselves are in another State. Childs vs. Digby.
FORGERY.
See Bill of Exchange.
FUTURE ADVANCES.
See Mlortgage.
GRAND JURY.
1. When a prisoner has been indicted by the Grand Jury upon evidence
-which appeared solely by affidavits accompanying the indictment and agreed
to be read, and the facts in which were conceded to exhibit no legal evidence whatever, of the violation of a statute concerning false pretences,
the Court will quash the indictment. The People vs. Herman Ristenbatt. 418
2. Indictment defined, and authorities for definition cited. Ibid.
3. The Grand Jury is without authority to indict for want of jurisdiction
of the subject matter, except upon sworn legal testimony, duly taken before
a constituted authority. Ibid.
4. If there is any legal proof of the offence charged, no matter how little,
the Court will not quash the indictment, but will send it for trial to a petit
jury. Ibid.
HABEAS CORPUS.
1. The 7th section of the Act of Congress of 2d 'March, 1833, commonly
called "The Force Bill," which authorizes the writ of habeas corpus to be
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issued by the courts of the United States, under certain circumstances, for
the protection of officers, and others acting with them, in execution of the
laws of the United States, is to be confined in its application to cases where
there has been an avowed purpose, by some authority or law of a slate, to
disregard an act of Congress, and to imprison or otherwise punish the officers of the United States for enforcing it; and operates, moreover, only in
cases where such purpose appears on the face of the proceedings. Where a
habeas corpus has been issued in pursuance of a statute, by a United States
Court, it has no right to go behind the return to the writ; and if it does,
and discharges the relator, upon evidence taken at the hearing, such discharge is inoperative, and will be disregarded by a State Court. Thomas
vs. Crossin.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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2. The marshal and deputy marshals of the C. C. for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, were arrested under a capias, in a civil action of assault
and battery, for abuse of power, brought in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. They took out a habeas corpus to the Circuit Court. On the hearing, evidence as to the real cause of action in the suit was entered into,
and the relators discharged. The sheriff returned these facts to the capias.
An attachment was applied for by the plaintiff against the sheriff, for not
bringing in the bodies of the defendants. The Court held that the discharge by the United States Court was invalid, but refused the attachment
under the circumstances, the plaintiff having unnecessarily delayed his application. It was decided, however, that the defendants might be considered as discharged on common bail, and that the plaintiff might proceed
regularly in his action. Ibid.
3. Where the defendant in a habeas corpus makes an evasive or false return thereto, he may be committed for a contempt, in order to compel
obedience to the writ. United States ex rel. Wheeler vs. Williamson.
729
4. The return to a habeas corpus, denying that the persons for whose
benefit the writ is issued, are in the defendant's "custody, possession,
power, or control," may be traversed and proved false on the hearing. Ibid.
6. In a case where the relator and the defendant were citizens of different States, a Court of the United States granted a habeas corpus, the
alleged detainer being without any authority of law, and of a purely civil
nature. Ibid.
6. The writ of habeas corpus may be issued on the petition bf a master,
whose slaves have been taken and detained from him by force. Ibid.
7. It is not material in such case that the abduction of the slaves from
their master has taken place while the master was in bona fide transit
over the soil of a State whose laws prohibit the institution of slavery.
Even if the slaves thereby became free, it would not justify their forcible
removal, without authority of law, and against their consent and that of
their master. Ibid.
8. A writ of habeascorpus cannot issue out of a State Court to inquire into
the cause of a commitment for contempt by a Court of the United States,
by reason of any want of jurisdiction of the latter Court in the original
proceedings, in the course of which the commitment was made. Exparte
Passmore Williamson.
.
.
.
.
741
HANSE TOWNS.
See Ship. 4.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See Married Woman's Act.
1. Where the husband occupies the relation of trustee to his wife, and
takes possession of her property in that capacity, such possession will not
486
bar her right if she survive him. Gochenaur's Estate.
2. Reduction, by a husband, of his wife's personal property into his
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possession-so as to change the ownership-is a question of intention to
be inquired of upon all the circumstances. Ibid.
3. Conversion is not reduction, but only evidence of it. Ibid.
4. Clear proof that the husband received his wife's money as a loan, or
a disclaimer of intention to make it his own property, will preserve her
right of survivorship. Ibid.
5. Alleged admissions to that effect by the husband must be scanned
with great vigilance, to prevent the consequences of misapprehension. Ibid.
6. Interest accruing during the husband's lifetime cannot be allowed, in
the distribution of his estate, upon a sum of money belonging to his wife,
that was in his hands, and which he might at any time have reduced into
his own possession, when there was nothing to indicate that he was willing
to pay interest for it. Ibid.
INDICTMENT.
See Criminal Law. See Grand Jury.
INFANT.
1. An infant who is furnished with necessaries, and the means in cash of
procuring them, by his parent or guardian, or from other sources, isprinza
fade not liable for necessaries furnished by a stranger or tradesman on
credit; and a party who seeks to evade the operation of the rule must prove
a state of destitution and necessity in the infant. Burghart vs. Hall, 4 M.
& W. 727, dissented from.

Rivers vs. Gregg. -

- -8

2. But a policy of insurance effected by the creditor under such circumstances, on the life of the infant as security for his debt is not affected, it
seems, by its invalidity: and at any rate, the proceeds of the policy cannot
be claimed by the infant's administrator. Ibid.
INJUNCTION.
See Constitutional Law. 7, 8, 16.
1. The principle is well established, that every common trespass is not a
foundation for an injunction, where it is only contingent and temporary;
but if it continue so long as to become a nuisance, the Court will Interfere
and grant an injunction. Whitfield vs. Rogers.
44
2. The rule is laid down that, in order to give jurisdiction, there must
be such an injury, as from its nature is not susceptible of being adequately
compensated by damages at law, or such as, from its continuance or permanent mischief, must occasion a constantly recurring grievance. Ibid.
3. A private individual may obtain an injunction to prevent a public mischief, by which he is affected in common with others. Ibid.
INSANITY.
See Evidence.
INSCRUTABLE FAULT.
See Collision.
INSURANCE.
1. A marine policy is to be construed according to the general and
known course of trade with regard to vessels of a similar character, with a
similar cargo, and on a similar voyage, to that insured. Mobile, &c. Insurance Co. vs. McMillan.
671
2. A policy of insurance was made on a cargo of cotton, shipped on
a sea-going steamer, the risk to commence at the port of Mobile, and to
continue and endure until the goods were safely landed at the port of e" Orleans. The instrument was in the usual form, and employed only the
usual terms, of a marine policy. The vessel arrived in due time at her
accustomed berth on the southern shore of Lake Pontchartrain, which is
well known to be the port of New Orleans for vessels of such character,
and from whence goods are conveyed by railway to the city itself' After
she had disclarged safely a portion of her cargo, an accidental fire destroyed, on the wharf, so much as she had landed. Held, that the risk
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under the policy terminated on a delivery at the wharf, and did not continue until delivery to the consignee, or his agent; that it was not necessary that the goods should be landed at the place where it was usual for the
conusignee to receive and take charge of them; and that the insurers were,
therefore, not liable. Ibid.
3. In this case, the policy was a valued one upon 198 bales of cotton,
valued at $50 a bale. Of these, 134 bales had been landed, and been
destroyed by the fire. Held, that the contract was a severable one; that
the insurers would have been liable, if at all, only for so many bales as
were actually destroyed; and that the insured could not recover as for a
total loss. Ibid.
.IUDGMENT.
1. A judgment of one court will not be enforced by another, unless it is
certain in itself, or is capable of being made so by intendment or presumption. Fritz vs. Fisher.
243
2. It seems, that a defence to the judgment of another State on the ground
of want of notice should be pleaded; and that when it is not, the judgment
will not be held invalid, merely because the record fails to show that notice was given. Ibid.
0. When a ship has been seized under a foreign attachment issued out
of a State Court and is in the hands of the sheriff, a subsequent seizure by
the marshal under an attachment for mariner's wages issued out of the District Court of the tTuited States, can operate only as a contingent seizure,
and depends for its efficacy on the event of the ship orits proceeds, or part
of them, being afterwards discharged from the seizure under the process of
the State Court. Carryl vs. Taylor.
394
4. There is no such superiority in the United States Court or in its attachment for mariners' wages, as entitles such a process to override and
frustrate the previous seizure under the process of the State Court; and a
sale under it while the ship remains in the custody of the State Court, or
after the State Court has sold it under the foreign attachment proceeding,
is void for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter. Ibid.
5. In a harmonious system of government the same property may be the
suiject of several seizures on writs from different Courts, but all after the
fir-t seizure muzt be subordinate to it and contingent, and can take effect
only after the first seizure has been satisfied or released. Ibid.
6. It is an essential rule of harmony, that, among co-ordinate jurisdictiuns, that one is exclusive which is first attached. Ibid.
LAND LAW.
1. A grant by the Political Chief for the time being of Alta California,
was not invalid, though it did not receive the previous approbation of
the Territorial Deputation. The grant conveyed a present and immediate
interest, and the neglect to obtain such approbation, if it were the duty of
the grantee at all, would have been only the breach of a condition subsequent, by which the title was not forfeited. Cruz Cervantes vs. The
United States.
74.5
2. In the same manner, conditions in such a grant, that the grantee
should build and inhabit a house within a certain time, and also obtain
judicial possession of the land, are conditions subsequent; and where, in
a particular case, after the time limited, the grantee actually took possession of the premises, and had lived on them and cultivated them for three
years when he obtained judicial possession, which he maintained till tie
tine of suit, a period of twelve years, it was held that the title had not
been forfeited. Ibid.
3. Itis also no objection to such a grant imade in 1 F*3) that the lands
comprehended by it were within the limits of a mission. Iil.
4. It is, finally, no objection to such a grant, that the land was within
Ten leagues of the sea-coast, and that the approbation of the Supreme Executive did not appear to have been obtained. Ii4,.
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5. A grant of land fraudulently obtained, is void ab ini/1, and no title
passes to the grantee, nor is the land separated from the public domain,
but remains subject to be located upon a valid certificate. Russell's Heirs
vs. Randolph.
560
LIEN.
1. Where A, the master of a brig, puts into a foreign port, by reason of
a leak, and there borrows money from B, and draws a bill of exchange upon
C, which bill is unpaid at maturity, ind at the same time that the bill is
drawn, he also executes a mortgage or hypothecation, in which there is a
special stipulation that B is not to take the usual marine risks in cases of
bottomry and hypothecation, neither instrument establishes a lien upon the
brig which can be enforced in the Admiralty, for want of jurisdiction.
Maitland & Co. vs. The Atlantic.
477
2. The essential difference between a bottomry bond and a simple loan
is, that on the latter, the money is at the risk of the torrower, and must
be paid at all events; in the former, it is at the risk of the lender during
the voyage, and the right to demand payment depends on the safe arrival
of the vessel. Ibid.
3. Admiralty cannot enforce a claim for money which has been advanced
on the personal credit of the vessel, owner or master, in a suit in ren. lb.
4. Where a bill is drawn, and a bottomry bond taken for the same sum,
the bill must share the fate of the bond. Ibid.
5. In a controversey, in which the question is, whether a steamboat was a
foreign or domestic boat, at the time the account accrued, for which the libel
is filed, the enrolment made under oath by the managing owner, pursuant
to the third section of the Act of Congress of the 31st December, 1792, requiring the enrolment to be made at the port nearest the residence of the
owne, is prima facie evidence that the boat belonged to such port. Dudley vs. The Steamboat Superior.
622
0. The proof afforded by such enrolment, will be held conclusive as to
the character of the boat, unless contradicted by clear evidence of the notorious residence of the owner or owners, at a place or port other than that
named in the enrolment. fl id.
7. The presumption of the knowledge that a boat belongs to the p,)rt of
of itc enrolment, as to those who fnrnish supplies or materials at that 1.,2t,
is strengthened by the fact that it bears on its stern, in conspicuous letters,
as required by the Act of Congress, the registered name of such beat, with
the port to which it belongs, especially where the evidence is, that such
boat made several trips weekly, to and from such port.
bid.
8. As to those claiming lens on a boat, as for supplies and materials
furnished under the circumstances above stated, proof that they gave credit
to the boat, as of a port of another State, will not avail, unless they have
used ordinary dilgence to ascertain its true character, or fraudulent or unfair means have been used to mislead and deceive them, as to the place to
which it belongs. Ibid.
9. Where a boat has been sold under an order of a Court of Admiralty,
and the proceeds paid into the Registry, and the fund is insufficient to pay
all the claims against it; on a question of distribution, the claimants uAill
be paid according to their priorities of privilege. Claims of seamen for
wages and of material-men, having a subsisting admiralty lien, if the fund
is sufficient, will be fully paid. The next class in privilege will be material-men having no lien but that acquired in virtue of a seizure under a
State law, who will be paid, pro rata, out of the balance of the fund, without reference to the time of seizure. Ibid.
10. A (laimant having an original admiralty lien, who has proceeded under
a State law, in a State court to enforce it, will be deemed to have waived
such original lien, and mu' t rely solely on the lien acquired by the scizure
under the State law. 1bid.
11. For supplies furnished, or repairs made to a boat belonging to
another State, there is an undoubted admiralty lien, equivelant to an hy-
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pothecation of the boat; but for supplies or repairs at the home port, there
is no lien, unless given by State law. It is competent for a State to provide such a lien, and the national admiralty courts will execute a State
law for such purpose; but State legislation cannot supersede or destroy a
lien acquired by the general maritime law. Ibid.
12. A master of a boat or vessel, has no lien for his wages as such. Ibid.
LUNATIC.
1. Where a creditor had been found lunatic in Scotland, and a curator
bonoruni appointed there-Held, that such curator bonorum has alone a
right to sue and give discharges for personal estate of the lunatic, in England. S-eott r8. Bientley.
566
2. The debtor not disputing his liability, nor the amount due, but only
the right to give a discharge, paid the amount into a bank :-Held, that
this wa equivalent to a declaration of trust, and that the curator bunorum was right in proceeding in equity. Ibid.
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.
See 'Married Woman's Act.

4.

MARRIED WOMAN'S ACT.
1. A married woman may give a judgment for the purchase money of real
estate, but execution will be confined to the real estate purchased. Patterson rs. Iobinson,
.
.
.
.
.
248
2. A married woman living with her husband, having carried on business
of trade in her own name, and purchased goods upon credit, and also ha:ving
a running account for goods purchased of her husband, cannot be proceeded
against as garnishee in an attachment against her husband. Avery and
Moody rs. Doane,
- 229
3. The act of Wisconsin to provide for the protection of married women
in the enjoyment of their own property, does not enable a married woman,
while living with her husband, to carry on trade to the exclusion of him or
his creditors, or to become his debtor in the business of the trade. Ibid.
4. A marriage settlement incomplete by reason of a want of trustees, is
only an agreement to make a settlement, and will not, at law, exempt the
annual crops of the wife's land front an execution against the husband.
Bruce and Wife vs. Thompson,
237
5. By the language of the Vermont Married Woman's Act, the annual
rr cdt of the wife's land is not exempted from the husband's control, or
frvrat his creditors. Ibid.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
See Contract. 6-15.
1. Where several persons are employed to attend to the same general
service, and one of them is injured from the carelessness of another, the
employer is not responsible. Ryan vs. The Cumberland Valley Railroad
Company,

-

-

-

2. Where A, a laborer on a railroad, engaged in making repairs on the
track, which are carried on partly by the use of a gravel train moved by
locomotive power, meets with an accident by the dumping of one of the
cars, lie has no remedy against the railroad. Ibid.
3. The relation of master and servant is a relation of contract. Ibid.

598

MECHANIC'S LIEN.
Where a mechanic's lien was filed for materials furnished at different
date, within two vears prior to the filing of the claim, it was l4d, that in
the absence of a special contract, no recovery could be bad on the scire
facia%, except foir materials furnished within six months prior to the filing
of the lien. Phillips is. Duncan,
30i
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MORTGAGE.
See Ship. 6.
A mortgage in the common form was given to secure moneys covenanted
to be advanced as buildings upon the premises progressed, Acid,
1. That the instrument by which the terms of the loan was regulated,
need not be recorded.
2. That the mortgage had priority of lien over the claims of mechanics,
from the date of its record, and not from the dates of its actual advance.
3. The agreement that the money should be appropriated towards paying
for materials and workmanship, neither postponed the mortgage nor required the mortgagee to see to the application of the money. Cadwalader
vs. Montgomery,
169
NEGLIGENCE.
See Railroads.
1. The jury in estimating damages under the Act of April 15, 18-51, may
take into consideration the age, habits, health, and pursuits of the deceased.
The measure of damages is the absolute value of the life lost, measured
according to its own merits, and not according to the necessities of the
kindred. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. vs. M'Closkey's Administrator,
412
2. The principle that allows an action for death of a freeman caused by
negligence, discussed and re-stated. Ibid.
3. The personal representatives may continue an action commenced under
the statute, and recover the very damages to which deceased would have
been entitled, had he survived until verdict. Ibid.
NOTICE.
See Carrier, 8, 10. Agency, 7.
NUISANCE.
See Constitutional Law, Injunction.
ORPHANS' COURT.
The Orphans' Court and its auditors have jurisdiction of the disputed
claim of a creditor against the estate of a decedent, whether the estate be
solvent or insolvent.

Gochenaur's Estate,

-

-

486

PASSENGER ACT.
Penalties under the Passenger Act (of Congress) of 1848, can only be
recovered by action of debt on the common law side of the District Court
of the United States, and not by libel in Admiralty. The penalties are
personal, and there is no lien on the vessel, and no remedy in ren, to enforce them. United States vs. Brig Neptune, 48
PATENT.
1. The extent of the rights secured to the patentee stated, and the case
of O'Reilly vs. Morse cited and affirmed. American Pin Co. vs. Oakville
Co.,
- 130
2. The means specified in the patent to produce the effect, and nothing
more, are secured to the patentee, and there can be no infringement unless
the same substantial means are used in both the plaintiffs' and defendants'
machines. Ibid.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
See Carrier, 4, 7. Judgment, Equity.
CLEDGE.
See-Agency. 1-3.
POLICY OF INSURANCE.
See Insurance.
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RAILROADS.
See Constitutional Law-Negligence-Master and Servant.
1. There is no law in Ohio prohibiting the owners of domestic animals,
consisting of cattle, horses, hogs, &c., from permitting such aniuals to run
at large upon the range of unenclosed lands, except when unruly and dangerous, and the rule of the common law of England, requiring the owner
of such animals to keep them oil his own land, or within enclosures, has
never been in force in Ohio, being inapplicable to the circumstances, condition and usages of the people, and also inconsistent with the legislation
of the State. Kerwhaker vs. The Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati
llailroad Company. .
.
.
.
.
.- 341
2. The owner of such animals, in allowing them to be at large on the
range of unenclosed lands, is not chargeable with an unlan:fud act, or an
omission of ordinary care in keeping his stock, doing nothing more than
that which has been customary, and by common consent, done by the people generally since the first settlement of the State, subject to the qualification, however, that animals which are unruly or dangerous, are required
to be restrained. Ibid.
3. There is no law in this State requiring anyperson to fence or enclose
his own lands: yet the person who leaves his grounds unenclosed, takes
the risk of occasional intrusions thereon, by the animals of others running at large. And the owner of such animals, in allowing them to be
at larze, takes the risk of their loss, or of injury to them by unavoidable accident, from any danger into which they may happen to wander.
Ibid.
4. The right of a railroad company to the free, exclusive and unmolested use of its railroad track, is nothing more than the right of every
land proprietor, in the actual use and occupancy of his lands, and does
not exempt the company from the duty enjoined by law upon every person, so to use his own property as not to do any unnecessary injury to
another. Ibid.
5. There is no law in Ohio requiring railroad companies to fence their
roads. but when they leave their railroads open and unenclosed by snfficent fences and cattle-guardq, they take the risk of intruions upon
their roads by animals running at large, as do other proprietors, who
leave their lands unenclosed: so that the owner of domestic animals,
in allowing them to be at large, takes the risk of their loss. or of injury to them by unavoidable accident; and the company, by leaving its
road unprotected by an enclosure, runs the risk of animals at large getting upon the road, without any remedy against the owner of the animals. Ibid.
6. The liability to make reparation for an injury by negligence, is
f.,undcd upon an original moral duty enjoined upon every person, so to
conduct himself, or exercise his own rights, as not to injure another.
Iid.
7. The mere fact that one person is in the wrong, does not necessarily
discharge another from the due observance of proper care towards him, or
the duty of so exercising his own rights, as not to do him any unnecessary
injury. Ibid.
8. The doctrine that, in the case of an injury by negligence, where the
parties are mutually in fault, the injured party is not entitled to redlress,
is subject to the following material qualifications, as appears from a review
of the decisions both in England and in this country, on the subject, to
wit:
The injured party, although in the fault to some extent-at the time,
may, notwithstanding this, be entitled to reparation in damages for an injury, which he used ordinary care to avoid.
When tile negligence of the defenlant in a suit upon such ground of action, i. the pro.,'-hae cause of the injury, but that of the plaintiff only
rimnote, consisting of some act or omission not occurring at the time of the
injury, the action is maintainable.
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Where a party has in his custody or control dangerous' instruments, or
means of injury, and negligently places or leaves them in a situation unsafe
to others, and another person, although at the time even in the commission
of a trespass, or otherwise somewhat in the wrong, sustains an injury
thereby, he may be entitled to redress.
And when the plaintiff, in the ordinary exercise of his own rghts, allows
his property to be in an exposed and hazardous position, and it becomes
injured by the neglect of ordinary care on the part of the defendant, he is
entitled to reparation, on the ground that although in allowing his~property to be exposed to danger, he took upon himself the risk of loss or
injury by 2nere accident, he did not thereby discharge the defendant from
the duty of observing ordinary care, or in other words, voluntarily incur
the risk of injury by the defendant's negligence. Ibid.
9. Having left its railroad unenclosed through a country where domestic animals are allowed to be at large, and thus exeosed to the casualties
of the animals accidentally getting upon the railway track, it is the duty
of the railroad company, acting through its agents, to use at least ordinary
and reasonablecare, and diligence to avoid unnecessary injury to the animals,
when found in the way of a train on the road. Ibid.
10. The first and paramount object of the attention of the agents of the
company, is due regard for the safety of the persons and property in their
charge on the train, for which they are held to a high degree of care, and
so far as consistent with this paramount duty, they are bound to the exercise of what in that peculiar business would be ordinary and reasonable
care to avoid unnecessary injury to animals casually coming upon their unenclosed road; and.for any injury to animals arising from a neglect of such
care, the company is liable in damages to the owner. Ibid.
RECORDING ACT.
See Mortgage.
REGISTRATION ACT.
See Ship. 6, 6.
RESERVATION.
See Deed.
SCHUYLER FRAUD.
See Agency.
SEAMAN'S WAGES.
See Ship, 4. Lien, 9-12.
SET-OFF.
1. As a general rule, debts sued for and intended to be set off, must be
mutual and due in the same right. Prouty vs. Hudson. 40
2. Where a judgment has been obtained against executors individually,
they cannot set off this judgment against one obtained by the decedent in
his life-time against their judgment creditor, because the claims are not
between the same parties nor in the same rights. Ibid.
SHIPS.
See Admiralty, Collision, Lien.
1. The Court confirming its decision in the case of Smith vs. The Creole
and Sampson, (2 Wallace, Jr. 485,) applies more strongly the doctrines of
that case; and holds that when even small vessels, ai coal heavers, are in
tow, the towing boat is the servant of the vessel towed, and that the tug,
being thus bound to obey the orders of the other vessel, is not responsible,
though in point of fact giving orders to her, for damages in the proper
course of its employment. The Steam Tug Sampson.
337
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2. Though the rule of porting the helm is obligatory, when in ordinary
cases vessels meet in the same line, it is not one always to be observed when
they are in 1yaralhllines. Circumstances control the rule; and, when a boat
is moving against the tide, slowly and with difficulty, (as when tugging a
heavy vessel,) and is out of the centre of the channel, which is left free to
the other, the rule can have no application. rid.
3. Steamers, especially large steamers, are held to the strictest care
possible when in ports or in the neighborhood of sailing and smaller vessels;
and must move slowly audwith extreme circumspection. And if from violation of this duty, small or sailing vessels are put suddenly into confusion
or jeopardy, the Court will not inquire whether the rules applicable to
ordinary cases of meeting, have been strictly observed by the weaker vessel, or not; but will hold the steamer responsible, as reckless, for all injury
happening to or committed through the act of the weaker vessel, from mistake caused by the embarrassment natural to the condition into which the
steamer had put the weaker vessel. Ibid.
4. By the terms of the Treaty between the United States and the Hanseatic Towns, a Court of Admiralty here has no jurisdiction of a libel for wages
by a Bremen sailor against a Bremen vessel, though he had shipped in the
United States. Kendept vs. The Barque Korner.
47
5. Construction of the Act of 29th July, 18.50, relating to conveyance of
vessels. Reeder vs. Steamship George's Creek. 232
6. A recorded mortgage of a vessel does not take priority over a subsequent lien, obtained by a material man, for necessary supplies or repairs.
Ibid.
SLAVE.
See Contract, 6, &c.
STEAMBOAT.
1. The boat will be liable, when it is furnished with state rooms and
locks to the doors, if a watch, breastpin, pocket-money, and such like,
should be stolen from the room in the night-time, without breaking.
This is the general rule, though there are exceptions. Vanderpool rs. The
Steamboat Crystal Palace.
493
2. Where such is the structure of the berths, the officers of the boat
must know whether the locks are in order or not; and if not, they must
look to the protection of such proterty of the passenger, as before mentioned. It is not the duty of the passenger, in such case, as a general
rule, to take such articles to the clerk, or other officer, for safe keeping.
They are part of his personal apparel, and the inconvenience would be
too great. Ibid.
STEAM TUGS.
See Ship.
SUrERSEDEAS.
See Equity.

1.
2.

TAX SALE.
1. Where land is sold under a tax-law, it is necessary that every prerequisite in the statute should be strictly complied with; otherwise, the
purchaser under the tax-sale will take no title. Yendo vs. Wheeler,
- 306
2. An assessment to be valid under the Texas statute, with a view of
collecting the taxes, must embrace a true description of the land, together
with the name of the actual owner, whether resident or non-resident, and
such other descriptive matter as will apprise the owner that his land is
about to be sold for taxes. Ibid.
THEFT.
See Steamboat.
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TRUSTS.
See Charitable Uses.
UNITED STATES COURTS.
See Habeas Corpus.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
See Bill of Exchange.
1. A covenant "to make a good and sufficient deed of conveyance" is not
satisfied by the execution of a deed good in point ofform only; there is an
279
implied undertaking to make a good title. Burwell vs. Jackson,
2. In an executory agreement to purchase laud, the purchaser is not
bound to examine the title before entering into the agreement, and if the
title prove defective upon examination, the vendee cannot be compelled to
take it. Ibid.
3. The implied warranty of the vendor ceases upon the execution of the
deed, as the vendee is presumed to have examined the title and to be satisfied
with it. Ibid.
4. The cases of Gazely vs. Price, and Parkervs. Parmlee, commented on.
Ibid.
5. The covenants in this case are dependent covenants, and the execution
of the deed is a condition precedent to the payment of instalments subsequent to the first. Ibid.
6. Where the title of a vendor who has covenanted to convey is totally
destroyed, the vendee is not bound, either to offer to perform on his part,
or to require performance by the vendor, but may treat the contract as
rescinded, Ibid.
WILL.
1. Proof of the regular execution of a testamentary paper establishes a
prima facie case in favor of the party alleging a will. Davis vs. Davis'
Executor,

.

.

533

..

2. Definition of a will. Ibid.
3. The competency of parol testimony, in order to ascertain whether a
paper writing purporting to be a last will, considered, and such testimony
admitted. Ibid.
4. The party propounding the will must show that the document in question was made as a will, by one capable of making a will, having a knowledge that he was making a will, and informed of its contents.
5. The executor and trustee, who takes an interest in a will, cannot be
a witness to sustain it. ibid.
6. When a devise or bequest is ambiguously expressed, it is alwiys important to bear in mind the inclination which the law has in favor of the
heirs, which, with us, is a rule of equality, and also in favor of a vesting
of the estate at the death of the testator, or at the earliest possible period
thereafter, and also in favor of an absolute, and against a defeasible estate.
Matter of Etter's Will,

-.

.

.

7. It is under the influence of this bias, that words of survivorship are
generally referred to at death of the testator, if there be nothing indicating
a contrary intention. Ibid.
8. Where land was devised to a son for life, with the provision that at
his death, without issue living, it "shall revert to my estate, and shall be
sold by my executors, and the proceeds thereof be distributed among my
surviving heirs herein named, agreeably to the intestate laws of Pennsylvania." Held, that this created a vested remainder in the devisees and
legatees living at the death of the testator, subject to be devested on the
son's dying, leaving issue, and that the share of one of the devisees who
died before the termination of a precedent estate, passed to her legal representatives. Ibid.
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9. "Heirs" construed to mean children, from the context. rarAl rs.
Ferris,
- 101
10. Adverbs of time, as when, then, after, from, &e., ina devise of a remainder are to be construed as relating to the time of the enjoyment of
the estate, not to that of its Testing in interest. Ibid.
11. Devise of a life estate, and if the first taker "should die without children," then over, held under the circumstances to mean without haring had
children. Ibid.
12. A testator devised as follows: Secondly, "to mydanghterE, the use"
of 267 acres of land, "during her natural life, to have full use and control
of the same, with the appurtenances to the same belonging, as long as she
shall live." Thirdly, le devised to his "daughter E's children, (if she
shall have any heirs,) their heirs and assigns forever," the 267 acres of
land "after E is done using and occupying it, and at E's death." Fourthly,
If his "daughter E should die without children," then he devised the 267
acres to his "brothers and sisters, their heirs and assigns forever, after
the death of E as aforesaid. E was unmarried at the testator's death, but
married afterwards. She had but one child, which lived only a few hours,
and soon died herself, having devised all her estate to her husband.
Held, that the limitation to E's children, and that to the testator's brothers
and sisters, were alternative contingent remainders in fee, the contingency
being the birth of children ; and that the first remainder vested in E's child
at its birth, descended at its death, upon E; and then passed under her will to her husband. Ibid.
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